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1INDUCING VALUE-CONGRUENT BEHAVIOR THROUGH ADVERTISING AND 
THE MODERATING ROLE OF ATTITUDES TOWARD ADVERTISING
Abstract
Advertisements frequently link values to advertised products or services, but little is known 
about the effect of this practice on value-driven behavior that is unrelated the advertising 
context. Evidence from two studies show that exposure to value-laden advertisements 
instigates behavior that is congruent with the ‘advertised’ value (i.e., self-direction, security, 
achievement or benevolence). Moreover, attitudes toward advertising moderate this effect. To 
the extent that people value positive aspects or dislike negative aspects of advertising, value-
congruent behavior becomes respectively more or less likely following exposure to value-
laden ads. The results highlight new aspects of unintended influences of exposure to 
advertising.
2Marketers know that personal values play an important role in buying decisions. For 
example, an individual who defines himself as someone who is concerned about the 
environment will probably buy a different car than someone whose primary goal in life is to 
have fun and to enjoy him/her. In fact, according to the means-end theory (Gutman 1982), 
consumers contemplate how certain products may help them to attain their higher goals and 
values when facing a buying decision. Associative advertising, a strategy whereby advertisers 
incorporate values in their campaigns to create a product image (Reynolds and Gutman 1984), 
may therefore be an effective tool for marketers. The relative importance individuals attach to 
different personal values, however, is not confined to consumer decisions, but affects many 
everyday decisions and judgments. For instance, someone who thinks that being loyal to 
friends is more important than enjoying life will prefer staying at home to help his friend with 
his homework instead of going to a party that night. 
Different situational variables can temporarily change the priority of values within an 
individual, thereby changing their behavior. The present paper focuses on exactly associative 
advertising as one such possible situational variable. In particular, the present research
investigates whether exposure to value-laden advertising temporarily alters the importance of 
different values, thereby affecting value-driven behavior that does not involve the advertised 
product or service. In addition, we investigate whether the effect of ad exposure on shifts in 
value importance is moderated by one’s attitude toward advertising. In particular, we examine
whether individuals with a predominantly negative view of advertising are equally affected by 
value-laden advertising than individuals with a predominantly positive view of advertising.
The Dynamic Hierarchical Structure of Values
When asked to describe themselves, people often refer to the values they hold as 
guiding principles in their lives – such as being concerned about the environment, being loyal 
to friends, or attaching great importance to academic achievements. Values are conceptions of 
3desirable end states, represent a core characteristic of a person’s self concept, and are 
experienced as what one finds important in one’s life (Feather 1990, 1995; Schwartz 1992; 
Schwartz and Bilsky 1987, 1990). Although ample research has focused on the relation 
between culture (e.g., collectivistic vs. individualistic cultures; Triandis 1995) and the relative 
importance of different values, we are interested in the relative importance of different values
within individuals. Indeed, within a given culture, individuals may differ in how they rank
different values in terms of their importance to the self (e.g., valuing academic achievement 
more than being loyal to friends). In a situation involving a trade-off between competing 
values (e.g., going to a party or staying at home to study), the relative importance of values 
guides the selection of an appropriate action.
To better understand the link between values and behavior, we need to approach 
values as motivational mental constructs. Every value functions as a mean to attain a higher 
abstract goal. This motivates people to live up to their values. Schwartz (1992) distinguishes
52 values which are almost universally shared and categorizes them in ten different types of 
higher motivational goals. For instance, freedom, creativity and independency are, among 
others, three values that serve the higher motivational goal of self-direction. These 
motivational goals or value types can then further be positioned along two orthogonal bipolar 
dimensions (see Figure 1). A first dimension ranges from openness to change (self-direction, 
stimulation and hedonism) to conservation (tradition, security and conformism) while a 
second dimension ranges from self-enhancement (achievement and power) to self-
transcendence (universalism and benevolence). Values that are situated at one pole of a 
dimension (e.g., power and achievement) are thus congruent with each other because they 
serve the same motivational goal (e.g., social superiority and esteem). In contrast, values at
opposite poles are incongruent with each other because they serve different motivational goals. 
For instance, power and achievement promote personal well-being while the opposing values 
4of universalism and benevolence promote shared well-being with others. 
_____________________
Insert Figure 1 about here
Contrary to the conventional view, which states that the ranking of values is relatively 
stable across situations (e.g., Rokeach 1973), the value system is more often seen as dynamic: 
The hierarchy of values may change depending on specific issues and situations. For instance, 
participants rank ordered values differently after they had to write an essay on abortion or on
the environment than when they were simply asked to rank their values according to how 
important they were to them as guiding principles in their lives (Seligman and Katz 1996).
Individuals also reordered the priority of relevant values when they were asked to give 
reasons for specific values (Maio and Olson 1998) or when they were primed with a value 
(Verplanken and Holland 2002). Such findings explain why people may not always act 
consistently in situations that involve similar value trade-offs: Situational factors may 
differentially activate specific values and thereby temporarily cause a shift in the hierarchy of 
value priorities.
Because value systems are considered to be mental structures, value systems are 
characterized by two important features. First, values have to be activated to exert influence 
on behavior (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004; Verplanken and Holland 2002). Second, the activation 
can be attained by the situational activation of mental constructs, called “priming” (Bargh, 
Chen, and Burrows 1996; Verplanken and Holland 2002). For example, past research 
examining “automaticity” processes in behavior has shown that goals can be activated without 
the conscious awareness of the participants and may have powerful effects on behavior. For 
example, participants who were primed with the Apple logo behaved more creatively 
afterwards compared to participants who were primed with the IBM logo (Fitzsimons, 
Chartrand, and Fitzsimons 2008). Also, priming interdependence versus dependence has
differential effects on risk-taking (Mandel 2003) and on people’s worldview (Gardner, 
5Gabriel, and Lee 1999). The present research elaborates on these findings and explores
whether advertising - a medium that often uses values to render advertised products or service 
appealing to certain consumer segments – may function as a situational cue which may 
activate values, and hence may lead to a temporary shift in their relative importance.
Advertising as a Situational Cue 
Several studies suggest that advertising may activate specific values. In fact, 
researchers have used advertising images to prime cultural values or identity (Brumbaugh 
2002; Forehand and Deshpandé 2001; Whittler and Spira 2002). Usually, such studies focus 
on the effect of values in ads on ad evaluation. A couple of exceptions have, however,
investigated how values in ads may affect self-perceptions. For instance, Nairn and Berthon 
(2003) found that participants who viewed romantic advertisements rated themselves as more 
romantic (i.e., inspirational, creative, intuitive, imaginative) than participants who watched 
ads with a more classicistic character (i.e., straightforward, unadorned and unemotional).
Also, Zhang (2009) showed that salient self-construal shifted toward independence or 
interdependence (measured by a sentence construction task) in response to exposure to 
individualistic versus collectivistic advertisements. Yet, neither study included behavioral 
measures. 
Overall, the present research expands the existing results in two ways. First, if 
advertising really is capable of activating values, then there should be behavioral 
consequences that go beyond the advertising context. Because important individual values 
provide specific guidelines for behavior across different situations (Feather 1990), we expect 
that associative advertising can lead to general behavioral changes, even if that behavior has 
nothing to do with the product that is advertised. For example, when a consumer is exposed to 
advertising that sells computers as a means to attain independence, the value independence
may gain in importance in the personal value system of that consumer leading to other 
6choices in later decision situations that have nothing to do with the advertised brand or the 
advertised product (e.g., shall I go and buy a sweater alone or with a friend?). Although we 
only test the short-term consequences of being exposed to advertising, the present research 
nevertheless contributes to the ongoing debate of unintended effects of advertising (Pollay 
1986, 1987; Waide 1987; versus Holbrook 1987; Phillips 1997).
Second, the effect of value-laden advertising on the importance attached to the 
‘advertised values’, may depend on how consumers view advertising. Indeed, advertising is 
the medium “we love to hate”: People may lament the manipulative character of advertising, 
but at the same time believe that advertising is good for the economy, that it is informative, 
and sometimes find it amusing (e.g., Bauer and Greyser 1968; Durvasula et al. 1993; 
Muehling 1987; Pollay and Mittal 1993; Sandage and Leckenby 1980). This difference in 
attitude toward advertising is important as consumers with more favorable attitudes toward 
advertising are persuaded more by advertisements (Mehta 2000). In a similar vein, we predict 
that individuals who hold a predominantly positive view of advertising are more readily 
affected by the ‘advertised values’ than participants with a predominantly negative view.
There are different reasons to predict that attitude toward advertising may have a 
strong influence on the magnitude of the priming effects of advertising on value-driven 
behavior. First, Aarts, Custers and Holland (2007) previously showed that the effect of goal 
priming may be eliminated when the goal was primed in the presence of negatively valenced 
information. They reasoned that “the initial interest in the goal dwindles if a ‘no-go signal’, so 
to speak, is delivered …” (Aarts, Custers, and Holland 2007, p. 175). A similar process may 
operate when consumers are primed with motivational values from a source they do not like
(e.g., advertising for consumers with a negative attitude towards it). Second, according to the 
Flexible Correction Model (Wegener and Petty 1995) and other theories on mental 
contamination and mental correction (Wilson and Brekke 1994; Myers-Levy and Malaviya 
71999) people tend to correct their judgments when they (a) think they were influenced while 
making those judgments, (b) are motivated to correct for the bias and (c) are aware of the 
direction and the magnitude of the bias. We suggest that the attitude toward advertising may 
play a crucial role in whether or not individuals correct for the influence and how they correct 
for it. 
Possibly, individuals who predominantly view advertising as informative will be less 
likely to detect or consider advertising as a “mental contamination” source (Wilson and 
Brekke 1994) than individuals who do not hold this view. In addition, they may be less 
motivated to correct for the presumed bias as value-laden advertising may signal to 
consumers how much importance their society attaches to these values. After all, given that 
ads are more persuasive when they appeal to the values of the audience (Nelson et al. 2006;
Van Baaren and Ruivenkamp 2007), it makes sense that advertisers make use of values that 
are shared by as many consumers as possible. In sum, consumers who view advertising as 
informative may be less motivated to reduce the possible bias and therefore assimilate to the 
‘advertised’ values. 
Moreover, individuals who think of advertising as a highly manipulative institution
may not only more readily engage in judgment correction processes, but also judge the 
presumed influence as more severe than those who do not hold this view. As a result, they 
may overcorrect the presumed influence, and, hence, may be more prone to contrast their 
behavior away from the ‘advertised’ values (cf. Lombardi, Higgins, and Bargh 1987; 
Newman and Uleman 1990). In addition, those individuals may engage in more pronounced 
counter-argumentation (i.e., come up with more thoughts that are inconsistent with the 
advertised message) than consumers who do not view advertising as manipulative (cf. 
Obermiller, Spangenberg, and MacLachlan 2005). As a result, individuals may devalue the 
importance of ‘advertised’ values. 
8Overview of the Present Studies
In two studies, we explore the possibility that value-laden advertising may activate the 
‘advertised’ values and influence decisions that transcend the advertising context. To make 
sure that we used the full range of Schwartz’ circular model (Schwartz 1992), study 1 
involved the openness to change vs. conservation dimension while study 2 involved the self-
transcendence vs. self-enhancement dimension. For each pole of both dimensions, we selected
a value that represented that pole (see Table 1 for an overview of the selected values and their 
definitions used in both studies). Specifically, in study 1, we exposed participants to ads that 
stress self-direction (related to openness to change) versus advertisements that stress security 
(related to conservation). In study 2, participants either saw advertisements featuring 
benevolence (related to self-transcendence) or advertisements featuring achievement (related 
to self-enhancement).
____________________
Insert Table 1 about here
If advertising has the potential to activate the value type it communicates (i.e., self-
direction, security, benevolence or achievement), then decisions following the exposure to 
those advertisements should be driven by those primed values and the motivational goals 
these values refer to (i.e., openness to change, conservation, self-transcendence or self-
enhancement), even when the context is different from that of the advertisement. If, however, 
individuals have strong negative feelings toward advertising, they may feel motivated to undo 
the presumed influence. Hence, advertising may only activate values within individuals who 
have a predominantly positive attitude toward advertising. The moderating role of this
individual difference will be tested in study 2.
STUDY 1
Overview of Hypotheses
In study 1, after the presentation of the value-laden ads, we confronted participants 
9with dilemma-situations in which they had to make a hypothetical choice between an 
‘openness to change option’ or a ‘conservation option’. Because priming a specific value
increases the activation of closely related values (Bardi et al. 2009; Maio et al. 2009; Pakizeh, 
Gebauer, and Maio 2007), we hypothesized that participants who had been exposed to 
advertisements communicating self-direction would be more inclined to choose options which 
are consistent with values that are closely related to self-direction. In other words, we 
expected that participants in the self-direction ads condition would more often choose an 
option that reflect the values of the openness to change pole (i.e., self-direction, stimulation 
and hedonism), compared to participants in the security ads condition. In a similar vein, we 
hypothesized that participants in the security ads condition would choose the ‘conservation 
options’ (i.e., security, conformity and tradition) more often than the participants in the self-
direction ads condition. We did not expect an effect of exposure to self-direction (versus 
security) ads in dilemma situations that reflect universalism or benevolence versus
achievement or power, as these values refer to an orthogonal motivational dimension.
Moreover, to test whether the value-changes are also apparent in real behavior, at the 
end of the experiment participants had to choose between two candy-bars. We manipulated 
the perceived popularity of the two candy-bars. Since choosing the unpopular or deviant 
option is a way to emphasize one’s uniqueness (Kim and Markus 1999) and a popular option 
is a safer choice when in doubt about the taste, participants in the self-direction ads condition 
should have a higher preference for the seemingly unpopular candy-bar (compared to the 
security ads condition). 
Method
Participants. Ninety-four male and female undergraduates (60 women, 33 men, 1 
missing gender, mean age = 20 years) at a Belgian university were invited to the lab to 
complete a series of unrelated experiments on a computer. They were all paid € 6 for 
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participation.
Procedure. Participants were told that they were participating in a series of unrelated 
experiments. First, each participant had to rate how well-designed ten print ads were. In the 
self-direction ads condition, all advertisements highlighted values which were related to the 
motivational type of self-direction (featuring slogans like “You are unique”, “Play your own 
game”, “Be free to do what you want”). In the security ads condition, participants saw 
advertisements that communicate security (featuring slogans like “Protect the things you care 
about”, “Tradition in security”, “High and safe”). Participants were randomly assigned to one 
of both conditions, but due to server malfunction the self-direction ads condition comprised 
more participants (n = 55) than the security ads condition (n = 39). After this rating task, 
participants engaged in several unrelated filler tasks, for approximately 5 minutes.
In the second part of the experiment, participants were presented with ten scenarios 
adopted from Feather (1995). The scenarios always consisted of a situation which was 
presented along with two choice-options (e.g., choosing between job A that offers a lot of 
security in employment but without much opportunity for freedom, independence, or 
creativity and job B with much opportunity for freedom, independence, or creativity but 
without security in employment). In five scenarios, participants were asked to choose between 
an ‘openness to change option’ (self-direction, stimulation, hedonism) and a ‘conservation 
option’ (tradition, conformity, security). Five other scenarios were filler tasks as they did not 
involve a choice on the target dimension. In one scenario, participants had to choose between 
two self-transcendence options; in four other scenarios, a choice was required between a self-
enhancement option and a self-transcendence option.
At the end of the experiment, participants were told that we had candy left over from a 
previous experiment and that they were welcome to take one home. They could choose a 
candy-bar out of two different bowls filled with two different candy-bars (Bouchée or Twix 
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mini). Because one bowl always contained more empty wrappers than candy-bars, 
participants were given the impression that this candy-bar had been more popular in earlier 
sessions of the experiment. The other bowl contained more candy-bars than empty wrappers 
and was therefore more likely to be perceived as the unpopular option. A pretest was 
conducted to be sure that both candy-bars were both equally liked. We regularly changed the 
‘perceived popularity’ of both candy-bars during the experiment. 
Selection of ads. The selection of the print ads was based on a pretest. Ten 
undergraduates at a Belgian university rated 37 different existing print ads in terms of how 
strong the value of self-direction and security was highlighted in the advertisements (anchors 
1 “No presence of self-direction” to 5 “Clear presence of self-direction”). All ads were in 
Dutch and originated from Belgium or The Netherlands. Participants received the operational 
definitions of Table 1 in order to have a better understanding of the different values. The ten 
ads with the highest scores on self-direction were used for the self-direction ads condition.
The ten ads with the highest scores on security were used in the security ads condition. Both 
conditions differed significantly on the degree by which the ads communicated self-direction 
(Mself-direction ads = 4.69, Msecurity ads = 1.70; F (1, 18) = 688.29, p < .001) and security (Msecurity ads 
= 3.17, Mself-direction ads = 1.77; F (1, 18) = 13.22, p < .01).
Results
Across the five critical scenarios, we counted for each participant the number of 
choices that were congruent with the value “self-direction”. A one-way ANOVA revealed that 
participants in the self-direction ads condition indeed more often chose the option that was 
congruent with the value self-direction (M = 2.58, SD = 1.18) than participants in the security 
ads condition (M = 1.69, SD = 1.10): F (1, 92) = 13.65, p < .001. When gender was included 
in the analysis, the main effect of condition remained significant (F (1, 89) = 9.54, p < .01), 
and a main effect of gender emerged (F (1, 89) = 5.99, p = .02), indicating that men more 
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often chose the option that was congruent with the value self-direction (M = 2.67, SD = 1.24) 
than women did (M = 1.95, SD = 1.16). The interaction of gender and condition was not 
significant: F (1, 89) = 0.05, p = .82. 
As hypothesized, we did not find an effect of the condition on the amount of chosen 
self-transcendence options (F (1, 92) = 1.17, p = .28) across the four scenarios in which a 
choice was required between a self-transcendence and a self-enhancement option. Also, for
the scenario in which participants had to choose between two self-enhancement options, we 
did not find a significant difference between both conditions: χ² (1) = .03, p = .86.
These results indicate that participants’ scenario choices assimilate to the advertised 
values. When exposed to advertising that featured self-direction, participants were more likely 
to choose an option that reflected self-direction over a safe and traditional option. In addition, 
we found the same pattern of results when looking at actual behavior. Thirteen participants 
were excluded from the analysis (seven from the self-direction ads condition and six from the 
security ads condition) as they did not choose a candy bar because of dietary reasons. Since
gender did not yield any significant results, the variable was not included in the analysis. A 
chi-square analysis revealed a significant relationship between the condition participants were 
in and the candy-bar participants chose: χ² (1) = 3.89, p = .049. Participants in the self-
direction ads condition chose the unpopular candy-bar more often (64.6%) than the popular 
candy-bar (35.6%). In contrast, participants in the security ads condition preferred the popular 
candy-bar (57.6%) to the unpopular option (42.4%). Again, those results point to the 
inclination of less conformist (or more risk-taking) behavior after being exposed to self-
directed advertising.
Discussion
Study 1 provided evidence for our hypothesis that value-laden advertising may serve 
as a situational cue to activate the advertised values and thereby influence value-based 
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behavior. As predicted, participants who had been exposed to advertising featuring self-
direction, more often chose the option that was congruent with the value self-direction in a 
hypothetical dilemma situation than participants in the security ads condition. The result that 
participants in the self-direction ads condition more often chose an unpopular candy-bar than 
participants in the security ads condition shows that even a trivial choice can be influenced by 
the type of advertising people are exposed to. This result is particularly noteworthy in light of 
the fact that participants believed that the experiment was over at the time they made their 
choices and had no reason to believe that their snack choice was being monitored.
STUDY 2
Overview of Hypotheses
Study 2 extends the previous study in two ways. First, we wanted to generalize the 
findings obtained in study 1 by using ads featuring values referring to a different dimension 
than the values in study 1. In particular, we used the self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement 
dimension, resulting in a condition with ads highlighting benevolence and a condition with 
ads emphasizing achievement. To test whether associative advertisements cause a change in 
subsequent behavior we included two behavioral tasks involving achievement or benevolence. 
We hypothesized that participants in the achievement ads condition would persist longer on a 
difficult word-puzzle (compared to participants in the benevolence ads condition) as the ads 
made them attach greater importance to achieve something. The measure involving 
benevolence consisted of an information request following an invitation for blood donation. 
We predicted that participants who had been exposed to ads highlighting benevolence would 
be more interested in receiving information pertaining to a blood donation request (compared 
to participants in the achievement ads condition). 
Second, we included consumers’ attitudes toward advertising to test the hypothesis 
that the effect of exposure to ‘advertised values’ may be moderated by attitudes toward 
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advertising. Considering that consumers may be ambivalent about advertising, we expected 
that attitudes toward advertising would consist of both a positive attitude (measuring the 
extent to which one values the positive aspects of advertising) and a negative attitude 
(measuring the extent to which one dislikes the negative aspects of advertising). We predicted 
that valuing the positive aspects of advertising would drive participants to engage in more 
value-consistent behavior: Longer persistence in the word-puzzle task in the achievement ads 
condition and higher probability to ask for information on blood donation in the benevolence 
ads condition. In contrast, we predicted that disliking the negative aspects of advertising 
would temper the value-consistent behavior: Reduced persistence in the word-puzzle task in 
the achievement ads condition and lower probability to ask information on blood donation in 
the benevolence ads condition. 
Method
Participants. One hundred students from different faculties voluntarily participated in 
the study (54 women, 46 men, mean age = 21.2 years). One participant was omitted from the 
dataset because he failed to comply with the instructions. 
Procedure. At the beginning of the study, participants filled out a questionnaire on 
their attitudes toward advertising (translated from Pollay and Mittal 1993). Upon completion, 
all participants engaged in a task where they had to rate five print advertisements on some 
characteristics (e.g., design, quality, colors, etc.). In the achievement ads condition (n = 49), 
all print ads communicated the value achievement (slogans like “Are you the next top 
manager?”, “For people with ambition”). The benevolence ads condition (n = 50) consisted of 
advertisements that were benevolence-laden (slogans like “Are you the next volunteer?”, 
“Because knowing the other is the only way to friendship”). After this rating task, participants 
engaged in several unrelated filler tasks, for approximately 5 minutes.
In the second part of the study, participants were shown a string of eight letters 
15
(ADEORRTV) of which they had to make as many words consisting of at least five letters as 
they could. There was no time limit and participants were told that they could stop whenever 
they wanted to. The time participants engaged in the task was registered. 
At the end of the study, all participants were told that the Faculty of Medicine was 
looking for some volunteers to donate blood. Participants were asked whether they wanted to
register in order to receive more information on blood donation. 
Selection of ads. The selection of the print ads was based on a pretest and was similar 
to the pretest of study 1. In this study, however, we created fictitious ads because we lacked a 
sufficient number of real advertisements that clearly communicated benevolence. We created 
28 print ads by manipulating the slogan that accompanied a picture. The ads were then rated 
by 10 undergraduates at a Belgian university in terms of how strong benevolence and 
achievement was present in the advertisements (1 “value not present” to 5 “value definitely 
present”). The five ads with the highest scores on benevolence were used for the benevolence 
ads condition. The five ads with the highest scores on achievement were used in the 
achievement ads condition. Both conditions differed significantly on the degree by which the 
ads communicated benevolence (Machievement ads = 2.08, Mbenevolence ads = 4.44; F (1, 8) = 13.92, p
< .001) and achievement (Machievement ads = 4.40, Mbenevolence ads = 2.48; F (1, 8) = 74.45, p < 
.001).
Results
A principal component analysis with oblique rotation (oblimin) on the attitude towards 
advertising questions revealed two factors, based on the scree plot. The first factor consisted 
of items which measured to what extent participants perceived advertising as beneficial to the 
economy and as an important source of information (e.g., “Advertising helps raise our 
standard of living”, “Advertising tells me what people with life styles similar to mine are 
buying and using”). We will further refer to this factor as the valuation of the positive aspects
16
of advertising. The second factor measured to what extent participants perceived advertising 
as manipulative (e.g., “Advertising promotes undesirable values in our society”, “Advertising 
makes people buy unaffordable products just to show off”). This factor will be further 
referred to as the dislike of the negative aspects of advertising. 
The fact that two factors were obtained indicates that the valuation of the positive and 
dislike of the negative aspects of advertising are not two opposite poles of the same 
dimension. In fact, the two factors correlate very modestly (r = -.12, p = .22). People may thus 
value advertising for its information and positive consequences for the economy, but at the 
same time dislike the manipulative character of advertising.
Word puzzle. First, we investigated whether participants in the achievement ads 
condition persisted longer in the word puzzle task than participants in the benevolence ads 
condition, and whether this influence was moderated by the attitude participants had toward 
advertising. Therefore, a one-way (advertising condition: achievement ads vs. benevolence 
ads) independent ANCOVA was conducted with the two factors of attitude toward advertising 
as covariates and the time participants worked on the word puzzle as dependent variable. The 
interaction of the advertising condition with each of the two attitude factors was also included 
in the model. One participant from the achievement ads condition worked for 40 min on the 
word puzzle task. We decided to omit this outlier from the analysis (M = 10.90, SD = 6.07; 
without this participant: M = 10.60, SD = 5.33). The effects of gender were tested, but 
because none of the results reached significance, we omitted this variable from the analyses.
In line with our hypothesis, participants in the achievement ads condition persisted 
significantly longer in the puzzle task (M = 11.89, SE = .74) than participants in the 
benevolence ads condition (M = 9.32, SE = .72), F (1, 92) = 6.25, p = .01. Moreover, as can 
be seen in Figure 2 (left panel), the valuation of the positive aspects of advertising moderated 
the effect of condition on the time spent on the puzzle task, F (1, 92) = 4.48, p = .04. The 
17
more participants perceived advertising as informative and beneficial to the economy, the 
longer they persisted in the word puzzle task after exposure to ads highlighting achievement 
(B = 1.69, SE = .71, t = 2.36, p = .02), but not after exposure to ads highlighting benevolence 
(B = -0.51, SE = .76, t = -0.68, p = .50).
Contrary to our expectations, the dislike of the negative aspects of advertising did not 
moderate the effect of the advertising condition on the time participants persisted in the word 
puzzle task (Figure 2, right panel), F (1, 92) = 0.64, p = .43. 
_____________________
Insert Figure 2 about here
Finally, neither of the two attitude toward advertising factors had an overall effect on 
the time participants persisted in the puzzle task (dislike of the negative aspects of 
advertising: F (1, 92) = 0.78, p = .38, valuation of the positive aspects of advertising: F (1, 92) 
= 1.28, p = .26).
Blood donation. A chi-square analysis revealed that participants in the benevolence
ads condition were significantly more willing to put their names on the list in order to receive 
information on blood donation than participants in the achievement ads condition were. In the 
achievement ads condition, only 16.3% of the participants was interested in blood donation, 
whereas this percentage was 64% in the benevolence ads condition (χ² (1) = 23.36, p < .001). 
To explore whether the attitude toward advertising factors moderated this relationship, 
we conducted a logistic regression with the advertising condition and the two factors of 
attitude toward advertising as predictors of the blood donation measure, as well as the 
interaction of advertising condition with each of the two factors. The advertising condition 
remained a significant predictor (B = -2.46, SE = .56, Wald χ² (1) = 19.31, p < .001). The 
effects of gender were tested, but because none of the results reached significance, we omitted 
this variable from the analyses.
The valuation of the positive aspects of advertising significantly moderated the impact
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of the advertising condition on interest in blood donation (B = -1.54, SE = .56, Wald χ² (1) = 
7.54, p < .01). As can be seen in Figure 3 (left panel), a stronger valuation of the positive 
aspects of advertising led to a significantly higher probability of being interested in blood 
donation for participants in the benevolence ads condition (B = .85, SE = .40, Wald χ² (1) = 
4.61, p = .03), but not for participants in the achievement ads condition (B = -0.69, SE = .40, 
Wald χ² (1) = 3.02, p = .08). 
The interaction of the dislike of the negative aspects of advertising and the advertising 
condition on the interest in blood donation almost reached significance (B = 1.16, SE = .61, 
Wald χ² (1) = 3.64, p = .06). Figure 3 (right panel) shows that a stronger dislike of the 
negative aspects of advertising leads to a smaller probability of being interested in blood 
donation for participants in the benevolence ads condition (B = -1.40, SE = .50, Wald χ² (1) = 
7.82, p < .01), but not for participants in the achievement ads condition (B = -0.24, SE = .34, 
Wald χ² (1) = 0.48, p = .49).
Finally, overall, there was no significant effect of the valuation of the positive aspects
of advertising on blood donation (B = 0.08, SE = .28, Wald χ² (1) = 0.08, p = .77), while a 
stronger dislike of the negative aspects of advertising was associated to less interest in blood 
donation (B = -0.82, SE = .31, Wald χ² (1) = 7.25, p < .01).
_____________________
Insert Figure 3 about here
Discussion
In study 2, we replicated the finding that value-laden advertising affects value-relevant 
behaviour for a different value dimension than the dimension used in Study 1. Participants 
were more achievement-oriented after being exposed to ads that stressed achievement as they 
worked longer on a difficult word puzzle task. They were also more interested in information 
on blood donation after seeing ads featuring benevolence. This result is a strong validation of 
our hypothesis that associative advertising can influence value-expressive behavior even 
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when these behaviors do not involve the advertised products or services. As hypothesized, 
attitudes toward advertising moderate the effects of associative advertising on value-relevant 
behavior. In both the benevolence ads and the achievement ads conditions, we found that 
participants who strongly value the positive aspects of advertising show assimilation effects.
For participants who strongly dislike the negative aspects of advertising, we obtained contrast 
effects in the benevolence ads condition. However, contrary to our expectations, participants 
who dislike the negative aspects of advertising did not persist less in the puzzle task after 
exposure to associative advertising involving achievement.
A first tentative explanation for this unexpected result involves the acceptance of the 
use of achievement in advertising. It is possible that consumers with negative attitudes toward 
advertising accept and are used to advertising in which advertisers link a product to 
achievement but they may more readily disapprove of the use of benevolence as a frame to 
sell products or services. In other words, even consumers who strongly dislike the negative 
aspects of advertising may not object to the use of certain values in advertising and, 
consequently, may not correct their judgments regarding those values.
Drawing on the distinction between implicit and self-attributed motives (McClelland, 
Koestner, and Weinberger 1989), another explanation may be advanced for why participants 
did not show value-incongruent behavior on the puzzle task when disapproving the negative 
attributes of advertising. An implicit motive is seen as the drive that energizes, directs and 
selects behavior, because of the pleasure derived from the activity itself. Self-attributed 
motives, on the other hand, are more conscious articulations of the motives people may have, 
and are expressed when directly asked for. Hence, implicit motives predict spontaneous 
behavioral trends over time, while self-attributed motives only predict immediate choice 
behavior when social incentives such as rewards, prompts, expectations or demands are 
present. According to Verplanken and Holland (2002), values may thus “serve motives 
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implied by the immediate situation or more implicit motives” (p. 444). More important for our 
research is that, once activated, implicit motives are independent of cognitions or affect such 
as attitudes toward advertising while self-attributed motives are not. This means that if the 
primed value serves to activate implicit motives, the subsequent behavior will be value-
congruent, irrespective of the participants’ attitudes toward advertising. 
In an unpublished survey, we asked college students to indicate on a 7-point scale how 
important the different values were for them in their lives (ranging from 1 to 7). Benevolence 
had the highest score (M = 5.81, SD = 1.18), which is compatible with the idea that 
participants in study 2 have high self-attributed benevolence motives, leading to moderation 
effects of attitudes toward advertising. The importance attached to achievement, however, 
was situated around the midpoint (M = 4.43, SD = 1.04), pointing at lower self-attributed 
achievement motives. Given that the sample in study 2 also consisted of college students, 
achievement may have been an implicit drive for most of the participants. If so, exposure to 
achievement ads may have activated the implicit achievement motive, resulting in longer 
persistence times on the puzzle task, irrespective of how negative one is about advertising. 
While viewing achievement as an implicit rather than as a self-attributed motive may explain 
the lack of moderation by negative attitude toward advertising in the achievement condition, it 
does not explain why we did find moderation by positive attitude toward advertising in that 
condition. However, if participants with a strong implicit achievement motive also have a 
strong positive attitude toward advertising, this confound may exhibit itself as a moderation of 
positive attitudes toward advertising. Although it is intuitive appealing idea, we do not have 
the data to support this suggestion and hope to test this in future research.
One could argue that it is hard to attribute our results to either contrast effects or to 
assimilation effects in the absence of a proper control condition. It should be noted, however, 
that the specific interactions with the two attitudes toward advertising factors do allow an 
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interpretation in terms of contrast and assimilation effects. In a sense, participants who score 
low on a given attitude factor may be considered ‘controls’ for participants who score high on 
that attitude factor. The fact that, within a given condition, participants behave more in 
accordance with the advertised value as they more strongly value the positive aspects of 
advertising is indicative of an assimilation effect. In similar vein, the fact that, within a given 
condition, participants behave less in accordance with the advertised value as they more 
strongly dislike the negative aspects of advertising is indicative of a contrast effect. 
When looking at the moderation effect for both the positive and negative aspects of 
advertising, two things are noteworthy. First, dislike of the negative and valuation of the 
positive aspects of advertising are not two opposite poles of the same dimension. Rather, they 
form two separate dimensions, on which consumers can score low on both – implying 
indifference toward advertising – or high on both – implying ambivalence toward advertising. 
Second, the fact that both factors moderate the effect of associative advertising points towards 
different mechanisms. In line with the Flexible Correction Model (Wegener and Petty 1995), 
we already raised the possibility that the valuation of positive aspects of advertising may 
reduce both the tendency to perceive advertisements as a source of “mental contamination”
(Wilson and Brekke 1994) and the motivation to correct for the bias. The dislike of the 
negative aspects of advertising may enhance the motivation to engage in bias correction, or 
may lead to more pronounced counter-argumentation when watching the advertisement. At 
this point, however, we only can speculate about the exact mechanisms that come into play. It 
may also be, for example, that individuals who strongly value the positive aspects of 
advertising may simply look longer at ads, pay more attention to advertisements or engage in 
more pro-argumentation (i.e., come up with arguments that support the advertised message) 
than individuals who do not value the positive aspects of advertising that much. Longer 
exposure times may enhance the chance of being influenced by the value communicated by 
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the ad and, consequently, may explain why participants who strongly value the positive 
aspects of advertising assimilate more to an advertised value than participants who value the 
positive aspects less. Although the focus of the current paper was not to disentangle the 
process of the moderation effect, we think it is very interesting to asses this question in future 
research. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present studies demonstrated that value-laden advertising may affect the behavior 
of those who are exposed to it. In Study 1, participants chose the self-direction option more,
both in hypothetical scenarios and in a real candy choice task after exposure to ads featuring 
self-direction than after exposure to ads featuring security. In study 2, participants persisted 
longer in a puzzle task after exposure to ads featuring achievement than after exposure to ads 
featuring benevolence. Conversely, participants indicated more interest in blood donation 
after exposure to ads featuring benevolence than after exposure to ads featuring achievement. 
In addition, Study 2 showed that the attitude toward advertising moderates the effect of 
exposure to ‘advertised values’. Participants assimilated to the advertised values if they 
thought of advertising as informational and beneficial to the economy and contrasted away 
from the advertised values if they considered advertising as a manipulative institution. It 
should be noted, however, that the average participant in both studies showed an assimilation 
effect. In Study 1, we did not take attitudes toward advertising into account but observed an 
assimilation effect across our sample. In study 2, we observed an overall assimilation effect 
after controlling for attitudes toward advertising. Advertising can thus act as a situational cue 
that may temporarily affect value-driven behavior, albeit more so when one thinks of 
advertising as a source of information and consider it beneficial for the economy. 
Even though we demonstrated consistent results for our proposition, there are some 
possible limitations to the findings, some questions that still need to be answered, and some 
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interesting avenues for future research. First, the artificial setting in which the participants 
were exposed to the advertisements and the fact that the attitudes toward advertising were 
measured before the exposure to the ads are two limitations of the studies that deserve more 
attention in future research. It would be interesting to investigate the effects of values in ads 
in a more natural setting where participants may be less aware of the exposure to advertising. 
Second, in our studies only four values were used, leaving the possibility that we will 
not find the same results with advertising that incorporates other values, such as power, 
universalism, hedonism or stimulation. Although in the present studies we did not ask to rank-
order the values in terms of importance, we may infer from the unpublished survey with 
Belgian college-students that benevolence, self-direction and achievement are values that are 
important for college-students as the all scored above the midpoint of the scale. This brings us 
to the question whether our results can also be generalized to ‘advertised values’ that are less 
central to the individual. Indeed, previous research on goal-priming show that priming 
individuals with goals they do not already possess will not result in goal-directed behavior 
(Bargh 2002; Strahan, Spencer, and Zanna 2002; Karremans, Stroebe, and Claus 2006; Aarts 
and Chartrand 2005). Similarly, Verplanken and Holland (2002) found that value priming 
only works if the values are already part of the individual’s self-identity. Security is shown to 
be a less central value to the participants, and did instigate more security-driven behavior in 
Study 1. However, due to a lack of a proper control condition, we can not be certain that the 
difference between the security condition and the self-direction condition was due to 
participants attaching more importance in security values, or to a shift in importance of self-
direction. Future research is thus needed to investigate whether individuals may simply ignore 
or reject advertising that incorporates values that are not important to them or whether 
advertising can also temporarily increase the importance of less central values. If the later is 
true, associative advertising may be more powerful than just appealing to an audience that 
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already feels strongly about the advertised value: It may simply make the value more 
important and consequently make the product (which is a means to live up to that value) more 
appealing to a larger audience.
The results of our studies expand the already existing literature on the unintended 
effects of advertising. For instance, many studies have shown that exposure to thin models 
may adversely affect consumers’ (body) esteem (Richins 1991; Smeesters, Mussweiler, and 
Mandel 2010). However, none of those studies have investigated whether attitude toward 
advertising may moderate these effects. Possibly, the adverse effects of advertising on self-
esteem and other variables may be more pronounced among consumers who strongly value 
the positive effects of advertising and be mitigated among consumers who dislike the negative 
effects of advertising. Although the current paper does not address this possibility directly, the 
results of study 2 suggest that possible moderating effects of the attitude toward advertising 
deserve more attention in future research on unintended advertising effects.
Although both studies only involve short-term effects, we believe that the present 
findings can contribute to the debate as to whether advertising can mold cultural values in the 
long run. Considering the results of the present article, one may indeed wonder what the 
impact of advertising on values could be in the long run. First, it has been shown that frequent 
exposure to concepts may lead to chronic accessibility of those concepts (see Higgins 1996 
for an overview of effects from frequent exposure). The same may hold true for frequently 
primed values. Second, the present research shows that there is at least a temporary change in 
one’s behavior after exposure to value-laden advertising. Because values can be derived from 
past experiences (Higgins 2007), individuals may infer from their own behavior that they 
attach great importance to the advertised value considering that they have behaved
accordingly. Consistent short-term behavioral changes may thus lead to a long-term increase 
in the importance of the advertised value through a process of self-perception.
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The idea that advertising may have long-term unintended effects is reminiscent of 
cultivation theory (e.g., Gerbner et al. 2002). This theory claims that the reality depicted in the
media is a distorted version of the objective reality, and that this distorted view of reality 
affects people’s beliefs (first-order cultivation) and people’s attitudes and values (second-
order cultivation). Research on cultivation theory, however, typically focuses on the 
‘programs between the ads’ (Shrum 1999) rather than on the ads themselves. The fact that the 
attitudes toward advertising moderate the short-term effects of value-laden advertising shows 
that advertising may be processed differently than TV programs, thereby underlining the need 
to distinguish cultivation effects resulting from ad-exposure from cultivation effects resulting 
from TV programs.
Taken together, these studies contribute to the literature on the unintended effects of 
advertising in two respects. First, they show that associative advertising may affect 
consumers’ values. Second, Study 2 suggests that the extent of advertising effects may 
depend on one’s attitude toward advertising. Given that the audiences are becoming 
increasingly skeptical towards advertising, this last finding generates new avenues for future 
research. In any event, once again, advertising proves to be a powerful institution with far-
reaching consequences for all those who are frequently exposed to it.
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TABLE 1
Motivational types of Values, adapted from Schwartz (1992)
Study 1: Poles Study 1: Values
Openness to change 
(includes: self-direction, 
stimulation, hedonism)
Self-direction Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, 
exploring 





Security Safety, harmony and stability of society, relationships, 
and the self
(e.g., healthy, national security, social order, 
reciprocation of favors, family security, cleanliness, 
sense of belonging)




Achievement Personal success through demonstrating competence 
according to social standards 





Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people 
with whom one is in frequent personal contact 
(e.g., helpful, honest, forgiving, true friendship, 















































Schwartz’s (1992) Circular Model of Values.
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FIGURE 2
The Predicted Time Spent in Puzzle Task as a Function of Priming Condition and the 
Focus on Positive Features of Advertising (left panel) and the Focus on Negative 
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The Predicted Probability of Being Interested in Information on Blood Donation as a 
Function of Priming Condition and the Focus on Positive Features of Advertising (left 
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